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ABSTRACT 
 
Philosophers have recently begun to address the new 
intellectual challenges arising from the world of information 
and the information society. Consequently, a new and vitall y 
important area of research has begun to emerge, the philosophy 
of information (PI). This paper is the first attempt to analyse 
the potential nature of PI systematicall y. The paper aims to 
explain (1) what PI is (2) how PI has emerged (3) why there 
should be a new philosophical discipline such as PI, (4) what 
PI’s scientific goals are and, finall y, (5) what interpretations of 
PI are possible, either as a philosophy of science/technology or 
as a philosophy of information design. It is argued that PI is the 
philosophy for the information age, as it offers the systematic 
treatment of the philosophical foundations of the world of 
information and of an information society. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The information society  
The information society has been brought about by the fastest 
growing technology in history. No previous generation has 
ever been exposed to such an extraordinary acceleration of 
technological power and corresponding social changes. Total 
pervasiveness and high power have raised ICT (information 
and communication technology) to the status of the 
characteristic technology of our time, both rhetoricall y and 
iconographicall y. The computer presents itself as a culturall y 
defining technology and has become a symbol of the new 
mill ennium, playing a cultural role comparable to that of mill s 
in the Middle Ages, mechanical clocks in the seventeenth 
century and the loom or the steam engine in the age of the 
industrial revolution.  
These profound transformations have been already interpreted 
in terms of a digital-information turn. ICS (the cluster of 
Information and Computing Sciences that deal with the world 
of data structures and flows, including systems theory) and ICT 
appli cations are nowadays the most strategic of all the factors 
governing the li fe of our society and its future. The most 
developed post-industrial societies literall y li ve by information, 
and ICS-ICT is what keeps them constantly oxygenated.  
 
Three Relations between Philosophy and Computing 
Once it is acknowledged that the development of human 
society is at a stage in which issues concerning the creation, 
dynamics, management and utili sation of information are vital 
and very rich in consequences, it becomes legitimate to ask 
how far this macrocultural phenomenon concerns philosophy, 
both as an intellectual area, itself deeply affected by the recent 
transformations, and as a discipline that can provide the 
conceptual means necessary to explain and understand such 
significant phenomena. 
For the sake of simpli city, the different relations between 
philosophy, ICS and ICT can be organised into three, 
sometimes overlapping, areas (see [1] for further detail s).  
 
1. Philosophy Computing  
This is the branch of Humanities Computing that studies the 
appli cabilit y, and hence the development of ICT solutions to 
philosophy and logic, for teaching and information-
management purposes (e.g. didactic software and electronic 
editions of texts, or databases). In such a context, wondering 
what is impli cit in the relation between computing, ICT and 
philosophy means to ask not only whether philosophers may be 
able to exploit recent technological innovations for their work, 
and if so, to what extent, but also what it means for a 
philosopher to be abreast of the technology of our time. To 
give a specific example, until recently, the American 
Philosophical Association Committee for Philosophy and 
Computers focused almost entirely on what has been defined 
here Philosophy Computing. The most recent example of a 
Philosophy Computing product is probably the Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy on CDROM.  
 
2. Digital Philosophy 
This is a more recent development in the field, namely the use 
of ICT in philosophical investigations to model conceptual 
problems, as in the case of Artificial Morality, the use of 
computerised models for the study of rational choice in ethical 
contexts. 
 
It is clear that both (1) and (2) look at what ICT can do for 
philosophy. They do not investigate what philosophy can do 
for ICS. We shall see that this is one of the four goals of  
3. The Philosophy of Information (PI). 
 
 
2. THE DEFINITION OF PI 
 
What is PI precisely? A first step towards a clarification of the 
nature of PI can be taken by comparing it to other special 
branches of philosophy, such as the philosophy of mathematics 
or the philosophy of logic. These are old philosophical 
subjects, which nevertheless have acquired their salient 
features and become autonomous fields of investigation only 
relatively late in the history of thought. A second step requires 
the introduction of two distinctions.  
1) All  “philosophies of” manifest a tendency to converge 
towards two poles, one phenomenological and the other 
metatheoretical. The philosophy of language and the 
philosophy of knowledge are two examples of 
“phenomenologies” or philosophies of a phenomenon. Their 
subjects are semiotic codes, not linguistic theories; and 
epistemic capacities, practices and contents, not cogniti ve 
sciences. The philosophy of physics and the philosophy of 
social sciences, on the other hand, are obvious instances of 
“metatheories” . They investigate problems arising from 
organised systems of knowledge, which only in their turn 
investigate natural or human phenomena.  
2) Now, many “philosophies of” show only a tension towards 
the two poles, often combining phenomenological and 
metatheoretical interests. This is the case with the philosophy 
of mathematics and the philosophy of logic, for example, and 
the philosophy of information itself. These philosophies show a 
tendency to work on specific classes of first-order phenomena, 
but they also address these phenomena working their way 
through second-order approaches and issues, that is by starting 
from a metatheoretical interest in specific classes of theoretical 
statements, methodologies, technical concepts etc. concerning 
those very same classes of phenomena.  
The tension pull s each specific “philosophy of” towards one or 
the other pole. The philosophy of logic, to rely on the previous 
example, is metatheoreticall y biased. It shows a constant 
tendency to concentrate mainly on problems arising from logic 
understood as a specific mathematical theory of deductive 
inferences formall y valid, whereas it pays less attention to 
problems concerning logic as a field of phenomena, what one 
may call , for want of a better description, the expression of 
human rationalit y. Vice versa, the philosophy of information is 
phenomenologicall y biased. It is primaril y concerned with the 
whole domain of phenomena represented by the world of 
information (infosphere) and the information society, and can 
be seen to incline towards a metatheoretical approach only in 
so far as it may address its problems by starting from the 
vantage point represented by ICS.  As we shall  see, this 
explains the tension between (a) considering PI as separate 
from, but providing the methodological foundation of further 
information-theoretic approaches in philosophy and (b) 
considering the latter as cases of PI, belonging to it as specific 
branches. 
The following definiti on attempts to capture the clarifications 
introduced so far: 
(PI) the Philosophy of Information is the descriptive as 
well as normative branch of philosophy primaril y 
concerned with the conceptual and foundational 
investigation into the nature of information, its 
dynamics and utili sation.  
A few explanatory comments may be in order. By “dynamics 
of information” the definiti on refers to (a) the constitution of 
information environments, with their systemic properties, 
interactions, internal developments etc. and (b) information li fe 
cycles, i.e. the series of various stages in form and functional 
activity through which information can pass, from its initi al 
occurrence to its final utili sation and possible disappearance.1  
                                                    
1 For example, a typical li fe cycle can include the following 
phases: occurring (discovering, designing, authoring, etc.), 
processing and managing (collecting, validating, modifying, 
organising, indexing, classifying, filt ering, updating, sorting, 
The meaning of “descriptive”, “normative”, “conceptual” and 
“ foundational”  as used in (PI), although standard in the 
philosophical lexicon, will be full y clear once the goals of PI 
are introduced. To anticipate: PI treats information as 
something more elementary and basic than meaning or 
knowledge, on the same level with being. It provides a unified, 
explanatory theory of what information is, not a quantitative 
theory of data communication. And from an environmental 
perspective, it legislates on what may count as information and 
how information should be adequately created and 
manipulated. PI is based on a philosophy of the history of 
thought, which sees it as the most recent stage in the 
development of Western philosophy. If the scientific revolution 
in the seventeenth century made philosophers redirect their 
attention from the nature of the knowable object to the 
epistemic relation between it and the knowing subject, the 
subsequent growth of the information society and the 
appearance of the infosphere, as the true environment in which 
milli ons of people spend their time nowadays, have led 
contemporary philosophy to privilege criti cal reflection first on 
the domain represented by the memory and languages of 
organised knowledge, then on the instruments whereby the 
infosphere is managed and finall y on the nature of its very 
fabric and essence, information itself.  
 
 
3. THE EMERGENCE OF PI 
 
Is time ripe for the elaboration of a cohesive theoretical 
framework for PI? So far we have seen two different li nes of 
argument in favour of an aff irmative answer:  
1) scientific, technological, and sociological considerations, 
such as the development of ICS and ICT; the arising of 
the information society and of the knowledge economy, 
etc., and 
2) the development of the history of philosophy, whose 
central focus has moved from being, to knowledge, to 
meaning, to information. 
A third li ne of argument, perhaps more interesting here, is 
provided by the development of contemporary philosophy 
interpreted as a conceptual system:  
3) PI has emerged because of philosophy’s present 
scholasticism (see below for a detailed definiti on) and 
hence its distance from contemporary issues, as an 
alternative approach interested in, and capable to deal 
with the infosphere, which, in a way only apparently 
paradoxical, has been brought about by past philosophy.  
To understand (3), a fundamental dynamics in the development 
of reflection needs to be briefly explained. 
In order to flourish, the mind must make sense of its 
environment. It does so by investing realit y with meaning. This 
“semanticisation of being” consists in the development of 
environmentall y constrained epistemic narratives (self, 
ordinary experience, science…). It is a process that has an ideal 
direction, which can be called “windowing” , resulting from 
three conceptual vectors: externali sation of the conceptual 
environment within which the mind li ves (from infra-
subjective to inter-subjective), reification (hypostatisation) of 
                                                                                  
storing, networking, distributing, accessing, retrieving, 
transmitting etc.) and using (monitoring, modelli ng, analysing, 
explaining, planning, forecasting, decision-making, instructing, 
educating, learning, etc.). 
this environment, and de-physicali sation of nature (framing or 
virtuali sing the world). The information society can be seen as 
the most recent stage in this windowing process. Now, in the 
course of its evolution, the process of semanticisation leads to a 
fixation of the constructive conceptuali sation of realit y (views 
of the world), which ends into a (scholastic) closure of the 
system. This “scholastic loop” is the inevitable destiny of 
reflection: reflection is doomed to be initi all y innovative, to 
establi sh itself as a specific dominating paradigm (as the 
specific philosophy in power), hence to become fixed and 
increasingly rigid, further reinforcing itself, until it finall y 
becomes intolerant towards alternative conceptual innovations 
and so incapable of dealing with the ever changing 
environment (cf. Kuhn’s concept of “normali sation”  in [2]). 
The old paradigm is finall y challenged and replaced by further, 
innovative reflection only when the latter is suff iciently robust 
to represent a more viable alternative. Three factors can then 
force a conceptual system to innovate. There is the internal 
force, which pushes the system from within towards the 
threshold of change. This is the system’s natural inertia and a 
certain degree of positi ve resistance against innovation, which 
causes the “scholastic loop” just seen, and hence a constant 
increase in the fragilit y of the system. And there are two 
external forces, which pull the system from without. They are 
the substantial, conceptual novelties in the environment of the 
system and the appearance of a new approach capable to deal 
with them more successfull y.  
 
The Internal Force: Scholasticism 
Although this paper does not concern the internal crisis 
undergone by the philosophy system, it is important to keep in 
mind that contemporary philosophy may benefit from a radical 
reflection on its present state and tasks. Whenever philosophers 
become involved only with their own issues, while questions 
that would be of li vely interest outside the academia are 
disregarded as irrelevant, the phenomenon may be defined as 
scholasticism, the pedantic and intolerant adherence to the 
traditional teachings, “ right” methods, rigid canon of 
“ important”  texts or selection of “ truly philosophical”  
problems set by of a particular school of thought. Whenever 
reflection undergoes a process of scholasticisation, an 
increasingly wider gap between philosophers’ problems and 
philosophical problems begins to grow. As a consequence, 
philosophy becomes less and less relevant, interesting and 
useful: it addresses questions only philosophers belonging to 
the specific school are keen to ask, while faili ng to help us to 
understand, improve, control, or li ve morall y in our world. It is 
not unusual to hear the complaint that society does not listen to 
philosophers anymore, but it seems fair to retort that maybe it 
is the kind of philosophical research that our graduates are 
invited to develop that is no longer engaging the real world.  
Scholasticism is the negative pushing force of innovation, 
internal to any philosophical system. It fossili ses thought, and 
by making a philosophical school increasingly rigid and less 
responsive, it weakens its capacities of reaction to external 
inputs, divorces it from realit y, and hence prepares the ground 
for a solution of the crisis.  
 
The External Forces: PI and the Infosphere 
We are able to classify philosophy’s present predicament as 
one of scholasticism because we perceive that the system has 
become conceptuall y inadequate to cope with the new world 
surrounding it and hence needs to be innovated. Scholasticism, 
however, represent only a necessary condition of innovation. 
For it can only indicate that philosophy has reached a stage 
when it needs to develop a new approach, or a new 
methodology, or a new frame of concepts and theoretical 
concerns. It does not suff ice to indicate which direction the 
innovation should take. Historicall y, this is the task of other 
forces. Since the separation of the various forms of knowledge 
from philosophy itself—and this begins already in the Middle 
Age, with the separation between Theology and Philosophy—
the pulli ng force has become necessaril y external to philosophy 
(this is the heteronomous nature of philosophical innovation). 
In the past, it has been represented by factors such as Christian 
theology, the scientific revolution, the development of human 
sciences, the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, the 
foundational crisis in mathematics, the establi shment of 
mathematical logic, evolutionary theory, psychoanalysis, the 
theory of relativity, quantum physics. Nowadays, this pulli ng 
force is represented by the complex world of information and 
communication phenomena, their corresponding sciences and 
technologies and the new environments and social li fe brought 
about by them.  
Let us reconsider now our initi al question: is time ripe for the 
elaboration of a cohesive theoretical framework for PI? It 
seems that the answer must be aff irmative because the world is 
moving towards PI, the history of philosophy is moving 
towards PI, and the dynamic forces regulating the development 
of the philosophical system are moving towards PI. But then, 
what kind of PI should we try to develop? An answer to this 
question presupposes a clearer view of PI’s possible goals. 
 
 
4. THE FOUR GOALS OF PI 
 
On the basis of the previous analysis, PI emerges as a new 
philosophical paradigm with four main goals. PI can be 
expected to develop: 
 
a) a Unified Theory of Information (UTI) (Classic Goal) 
UTI constitutes the kernel of PI: it analyses, explains and 
evaluates the nature of information, its dynamics and its 
utili sation, with special attention to systemic issues arising 
from information environments. This is a classic goal insofar as 
it addresses the typical philosophical question “what is 
information?” . 
 
b) an Information-theoretic Philosophical Method (IPM) 
(Innovative Goal) 
On the basis of (a), PI can be expected to develop information-
theoretic and computing-based concepts, methods, tools and 
techniques, to model, explain and solve both traditional and 
new types of philosophical problems, arising in the infosphere 
and in the information society. It is important to stress that 
IPMs have already been applied in many philosophical areas, 
to extend our understanding of 
• the cogniti ve and linguistic abiliti es of humans and 
animals and the possibilit y of artificial forms of 
intelli gence (the Philosophy of AI; Information-
theoretic Semantics; Information-Theoretic 
Epistemology) 
• inferential and computational processes (the 
Philosophy of Computing; the Philosophy of 
Computer Science; Information-flow Logic) 
• the organizational principles of li fe and agency (the 
Philosophy of Artificial Life; Cybernetics and the 
Philosophy of Automata; Decision and Game 
Theory) 
• new approaches to modelli ng physical and 
conceptual systems (Formal Ontology, Theory of 
Information Systems) 
• the methodology of scientific knowledge (Model-
based Philosophy of Science; Computational 
Methodologies in the Philosophy of Science) 
• ethical problems (Computer and Information Ethics) 
• aesthetical issues (Digital Multimedia/Hypermedia 
Theory, Hypertext Theory and Literary Criti cism) 
• psychological, anthropological and social phenomena 
characterising the information society and human 
behaviour in digital environments  
(Cyberphilosophy).  
Indeed, the overlap between these Proto-Philosophies of 
Information and many other areas of philosophy shows that the 
development of the latter can be divided into pre- and post-
information turn.  
 
c) a Systematic Foundation (Systemic Goal) of Proto-PI 
On the basis of (b), PI can be expected to provide a unified and 
cohesive, theoretical framework for the various branches of the 
philosophy of information and computing (the proto-PI li sted 
above), from the Philosophy of AI to Computer Ethics.  
 
d) a Special Philosophy of Science/Technology 
(Methodological Goal) 
Still on the basis of (b), PI can also be expected to provide a 
unified and cohesive, theoretical framework for the information 
sciences and related disciplines, by isolating and systematising 
criti call y their conceptual, methodological and theoretical 
basis. 
Once PI is correctly understood as the study on the 
philosophical issues arising from the infosphere and the 
information society, and as a new philosophical methodology 
that can provide the foundation of both ICS and Proto-PI, it 
becomes easy to see why it cannot possibly be misunderstood 
for a sort of applied ICT or an ICT made simple—the role of 
mediation between the expert technician and the potential user 
still uninformed is certainly important, but completely 
irrelevant in this context—or for a more general and non-
empirical (and therefore useless, from the practical view 
represented by the market) continuation of ICS research by 
other means, to say it with von Clausewitz, as if by philosophy 
of information one should mean “abstract and a priori ICS” . 
The interpretation of the philosophy of information as the 
philosophy of the infosphere also clarifies the rationale behind 
some inclusions and exclusions, otherwise quite surprising. On 
the one hand, we reali se that the Proto-PI, li ke the philosophy 
of AI for example, do not belong, strictly speaking, to the 
philosophy of information as its branches, stemming from a 
common source, but rather as its fields of appli cation. That in 
both cases people are working on a common ground 
represented by ICS and ICT is irrelevant and misleading: the 
philosophy of AI is above all a metatheoretical philosophy, a 
philosophy of the theory, whose primary task for a long time 
has been that, eminently anthropocentric, of understanding 
better the human mind by studying forms of non-biological 
intelli gence, a program of research which obviously bears too 
faint a relation with the infosphere to be a constitutive part of 
PI. On the other hand, an excessive concern with the 
metatheoretical aspects of the philosophy of information may 
lead one to miss the important fact that it is perfectly legitimate 
to speak of PI even in authors who li ved centuries before the 
information revolution, and hence that it will be extremely 
fruitful to develop a historical approach and trace PI’s 
diachronic evolution, as long as the technical and conceptual 
framework of ICS are not anachronisticall y applied but are 
used to provide only the conceptual method and privileged 
perspective to evaluate in full reflections developed on the 
nature, dynamics and utili sation of information before the 
information digital revolution (three clear examples are 
provided by Plato’s Phaedrus, Descartes’  Meditations and 
Nietzsche’s On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life). 
This is significantly comparable with the development 
undergone by the philosophy of mathematics, which 
establi shed itself as an academic discipline only very recently 
in the history of thought, after the foundationali st crisis, but 
that is certainly present in many past philosophers, even if 
sometimes couched in different cloths. Similar considerations 
can finall y be extended to the distinction between computer art, 
which is certainly not a subject of investigation of PI just 
because computers are being employed as expressive means, 
and conceptual art, which even in extreme forms of expression, 
such as land art, indubitably represent an aesthetical 
valorisation of the constructed world of information, whose 
poetics must be placed within the more ample context of a 
philosophy of the infosphere to be properly understood. 
 
 
5. SHOULD THERE BE A PI? 
 
So should there be a PI, and if so, what kind of PI is more 
li kely to be developed? It has been argued above that any 
negative answer to the former question is inconsistent with the 
development of (a) contemporary society, (b) the history of 
philosophy and (c) our present philosophical system. 
Aff irmative answers, on the other hand, can lead to a 
minimali st or a maximali st approach.  
 
Minimalist Approach 
The Systemic and Methodological Goals (c)-(d) lead to a 
minimali st approach: there should be a philosophy of 
information, but this should be understood merely as a 
foundational philosophy of science/technology, whose 
theoretical input is provided by (i) various information-
theoretic and computing-based philosophies and (ii ) ICS.  
The problem with the minimali st approach is that, although it 
may appear to be theoreticall y safer because more modest, it 
fail s to take into account the fact that (c) and (d) require UTI 
and IPM. Either there is no PI, or a minimali st approach to PI 
leads inevitably to a maximali st approach.  
 
Maximalist Approach 
Both a minimali st approach and the Classic and Innovative 
Goals (a)-(b) lead to a maximali st approach: there should be a 
philosophy of information understood not merely in the 
minimali st sense, but above all as a philosophy of information 
design, which will  provide the systematic treatment of the 
philosophical foundations of an information society, and hence 
explain and guide the purposeful construction of our 
intellectual environment. PI is here interpreted as a philosophy 
of the information environments and therefore as the most 
fundamental area of philosophical interest in our time. It 
enables us to make sense of our world and construct it 
